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Having undergone three major identity shuffles in six 
decades, the Tunisian population has been exposed to a 
range of competing views about its past and future. Today, 
post-dictatorship political parties, instead of cementing 
peace between people and resolving opposing grand nar-
ratives, have only deepened the rifts, mainly for electoral 
reasons. This in turn is affecting the country’s youth, 
whose doubts about their own identity are making them 
susceptible to radical ideologies.
“Being Tunisian” today is explained by two major, 
contradictory narratives. One side, mainly represented by 
the Islamist Ennahdha party, sees Tunisia as an integral 
part of the Islamic world, with its customs and united 
trajectory, and blames the country’s semi-Westernization 
on French colonialism and postcolonial policies. The 
other side – loosely described as secularist and composed 
of different political parties over the year, most recently 
by the Nidaa Tounes party – takes a more nationalistic 
view, placing Tunisia within a context of Mediterranean 
cosmopolitanism and sees the country as sharing some 
of  Europe’s principles. This side links the rapid “Islamiza-
tion” of the country to the influence of Arab Gulf coun-
tries. These poles have stronger iterations as well. More 
extreme types of Islamists may serve as a grassroots to 
ISIS, while on the nationalist side, one may see advocates 
of authoritarian police states modeled on the postcolonial 
regimes that preceded the revolution using the “fight 
against Islamism” to justify their abuses of citizens’ rights.
Between these poles are other, more nuanced but less 
influential narratives. These include the identity proph-
esied by former President Moncef Marzouki’s support-
ers, which combines Islamist/pan-Arabist attachments 
and Europhile opinions; that of the leftist pan-Arabists, 
strong components of the Popular Front, who refute both 
Westernization and Islamization, while linking Tunisia to 
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In Tunisia today – a country burdened by a weak economy and experiencing precari-
ous security – the hotly debated question of Tunisian identity opens up a vacuum for 
radical groups to fill. Since its independence in 1956, Tunisia has been through three 
major historic chapters, each offering strikingly different views of Tunisian identity: 
the era of Habib Bourguiba (1957–1987), of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (1987–2011), and 
the revolutionary period that began in 2011. While the dictatorships of Bourguiba and 
Ben Ali were characterized by a top-down approach and a repression of all opposi-
tion, the post-2011 period of democracy and freedom of speech has allowed Tuni-
sians to conduct grass-roots discussions of what they identify with. Different identity 
cards have been played in the newly introduced electoral game, however, which 
makes defining what it means to be Tunisian a divisive practice indeed.
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pan-Arab, anti-imperialist past, and present causes; and 
other, more marginal views that pop up occasionally in 
the public sphere.
These debates are to be found less in rural settings 
than in urban ones, where political parties operate and 
where different media and social media outlets are 
watched, heard, and read. Facebook is the place where 
opinions are discussed and expanded the most. The 
social media platform is often the starting point of 
subsequent media wars regarding the positions men-
tioned above. The Islamist narrative is more widespread, 
however, as mosques and Islamic charities are a natural 
conduit for it and have greater influence on Tunisia’s 
remoter regions.
Bourguiba
Like most postcolonial states, Tunisia underwent a large 
identity shuffle in the first years of independence. Under 
the leadership of President Habib Bourguiba, Tunisian 
academics were tasked with creating a new Tunisian 
identity that would break both with the immediate colo-
nial past and with the more rooted Husainid history.1 In 
the new postcolonial schools, Tunisians were taught that 
their country dates back to the Phoenician period and 
that Tunisian identity was the result of a solid mixture of 
different civilizations.
Bourguiba made sure that the whole narrative revolved 
around his person and his own struggle for independence. 
Exceptions were made, such as keeping some of the val-
ues of French modernity in high regard, or glorifying the 
anti-colonial king Muhammad Moncef Bey (r. 1942–43). 
But in general, what preceded Bourguiba was demon-
ized or erased. Hence the French era was presented as 
sheer colonialism, the Husainid dynasty as corrupt and 
 malicious, and so forth.2 
In his quest for a modern and uniquely “Tunisian” state, 
Bourguiba wanted to take his people out of the cultural 
sphere of its time – that of Muslims and Arabs. His 
policies therefore relegated to the margins those who de-
fended pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. Those were to be 
found essentially in Tunisia’s south and west, inland, and 
more generally among the youth, who bridled under his 
authoritarian regime. By the end of the 1980s, the oppos-
ing forces became mostly Islamist – as in many countries 
in the MENA region such as Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. 
Islamism in Tunisia is the successor of a previous move-
ment, Youssefism, which opposed the 1955 negotiated 
agreements with France and the perceived Westerniza-
tion of society.3 The Mouvement de Tendance Islamique 
(MTI), which later became Ennahdha, was the  spearhead 
of Tunisia’s Islamists. Its grassroots and  leadership 
 included radical elements who prepared for armed con-
flict, be it through low-scale bombing campaigns such 
as the 1987 series of attacks on hotels or bigger projects, 
such as the coup attempt designed by MTI’s “Security 
Group” in 1987.
Although Islamists were at moments coopted, they 
were more often harassed and brutalized by the Bour-
guiba regime. All of Ennahdha’s leaders were jailed at 
least once in the 1980s, and some of them were sentenced 
to death, including the party’s founder Rached Ghannou-
chi. Bourguiba himself was not shy about expressing his 
disdain for some Islamic traditions while openly defend-
ing secularism. This provoked the anger of more tradi-
tional elements in society. Repression only strengthened 
the opposition and gave Islamists more legitimacy in their 
political and ideological claims.
Yet Bourguiba’s anti-colonial narrative benefited from 
a favorable international context. It was an era of pomp-
ous state building, and many Tunisians saw a positive 
difference between their quality of life and those of their 
parents. This included the introduction of elementary 
education on a broad scale, a gradual advance of public 
electricity and running water, job openings in the public 
sector, the liberation of women, and more.
The imposed nationalism did appeal to large segments 
of society, and Bourguiba’s efforts bore fruit. Bourguiba 
and his colleagues are largely credited with coining the 
postcolonial identity of the Tunisian state. At the same 
time, however, repression was rampant under his tenure, 
and those opposed to his vision faced widespread torture 
in prisons as well as extra-judiciary arrests and violence. 
Corruption was also high, with his inner circle benefiting 
from extensive privileges.
Ben Ali
When Prime Minister Ben Ali, a former director general of 
national security, toppled Bourguiba in 1987, he behaved 
toward the latter’s memory almost in the same manner as 
Bourguiba had toward his predecessors: by eliminating 
his traces. He shortened the space in history textbooks 
that Bourguiba had carved for his persona, introducing 
himself and his own “accomplishments” to the younger 
generation. In most public spaces, Bourguiba’s name, stat-
ues, and slogans were removed and very often replaced 
with Ben Ali’s own regalia. 
Some of Bourguiba’s actions were reversed, such 
as state secularism, which saw the introduction of a 
religious softener to calm the Islamist anger.4 Ben Ali in-
creased the space allocated to Islamic and Arabic history 
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in school textbooks, and courses in religious (Islamic) ed-
ucation were given more importance in school curricula. 
Ben Ali himself went on pilgrimage in 1988, adopting the 
title “Protector of the Land and Religion” and introducing 
religious concepts into his speeches. He has also released 
Ennahdha’s members from prison and allowed them to 
participate in elections. At the same time, however, the 
new leader was not known to be pious or religious in any 
way, and his changes mainly took the form of folkloric 
gestures. He also did not deviate radically from Bour-
guiba’s secular policies. Moreover, the corruption that 
later marked his reign, essentially centered around his 
family, made his Islamist reforms look like hypocrisy in 
the eyes of many. The growing socioeconomic divide that 
marked his era, partly the result of imposed IMF diktats, 
augmented the sense of alienation and marginalization 
among different segments of society, especially in Tuni-
sia’s south and west.
In terms of Tunisian identity, Ben Ali’s strategy was 
one of “fill in the blanks.” Most of the streets and av-
enues named after Bourguiba were renamed “November 
7,” commemorating the date he came to power. Where 
Bourguiba had filled public squares with his statues, Ben 
Ali erected statues of the “7” and also named schools 
and squares after that date. He generally refrained from 
putting his name on public buildings, so while Bourguiba 
had for instance named bridges and airports after himself, 
Ben Ali preferred to give them his “7.”
It was a personality cult without a personality. Ben Ali 
virtually lacked charisma. To an increasingly educated 
population that was growing more connected to the 
international world, the wooden language adopted by 
his administration officials sounded dull. Ben Ali was a 
cold president who kept his people at bay. His attempts to 
shape a different narrative of postcolonial history actually 
cancelled some of Bourguiba’s achievements in crafting a 
postcolonial identity, without offering a viable alternative.
What Ben Ali succeeded in building, in fact, was an 
extremely repressive police state. While initially reach-
ing out to democrats and former opponents, he gradually 
smashed political life and civil society. His openings 
toward Islamists were only a façade. Even while soften-
ing the social repression of Islam, Ben Ali nonetheless 
succeeded in increasing its political repression. 
By dismantling Bourguiba’s narrative and offering a 
hollow alternative while reversing some directing lines, 
Ben Ali weakened Tunisia’s burgeoning postcolonial 
nationalism. Meanwhile, his suppression of political life 
diminished critical thinking in all fields.5 When he fled in 
2011, the youth of the country not only thirsted for liberty 
and better quality of life but was also in search  
of an identity.
Revolution and Democracy
To explain the crisis of Tunisia’s youth, Ennahdha’s 
Rached Ghanouchi often refers to the “religious desertifi-
cation” that was imposed under both Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali.6 “Who will dialogue with them?” he said in a recent 
interview, referring to the violent extremists. “There is 
a religious desertification in Tunisia and we don’t have 
religious scholars anymore.”7 His opinion is widely shared 
by Tunisia experts and observers, but it misses the other 
“desertification” that affected Tunisians, especially during 
the tenure of Ben Ali: the political and identity vacuum.
Ben Ali’s departure led once again to a hammering of 
public memory. In a matter of hours, Ben Ali’s symbols 
and pictures were removed, and the fear he used to con-
vey became mockery of and hatred toward his persona. 
Even his erstwhile collaborators became outspoken critics 
of his authoritarian behavior and found that he was a 
convenient scapegoat for all of Tunisia’s woes. The Ben 
Ali era was soon – in hindsight – described as Tunisia’s 
darkest hour.
A bottom-up program of identity reconstruction then 
began, one that contrasted with the prior top-down 
processes. But unlike the previous eras, bashing Ben Ali 
did not pave the way for a uniform narrative. The spirit 
of the new Tunisia was “democracy,” but enthusiasm for 
democracy cannot in itself become an identity. Moreover, 
no one was strong enough to impose any unified vision. 
Democracy opened a Pandora’s box, and the previously 
oppressed ideologies reappeared.
After 2011, a newly emerging and rapidly growing 
media space was full of guests claiming different ideolo-
gies and offering Tunisians a set of visions they had barely 
heard of before. Those who were sidelined in the nation-
building processes from the 1950s onward joined the fray 
with views on what the state’s identity should consist of. 
Former young activists, who had by 2011 reached their 
50s and 60s – sometimes their 80s – rolled out their ideas 
the way merchants show their wares. Various kinds of 
Marxists resumed the old struggles of the Cold-War era. 
Old-time Islamists who went into structural reforms and 
adopted a softened, Westernized discourse were clashing 
with younger, newly radicalized ones. Ultra pan-Arabs 
were linking Tunisia to an imagined Arab World, while 
ultra-nationalists tried to disseminate the idea of a three-
thousand-year-old nation state, and so on.
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Nevertheless, the most enduring debate, and the deep-
est one, was over Tunisia’s spiritual identity: was it more 
Tunisian than Islamic, or vice versa? 
When the Ennahdha party emerged as the major win-
ner of the 2011 election, its opponents did not therefore 
perceive it as a simple electoral defeat but as a threat to 
the country’s identity. The main argument of the opposi-
tion (to Ennahdha), aside from stressing economic and se-
curity problems, became that of the threatened Tunisian 
way of life, the namat. Ennahdha, on the other side, tried 
to unite Islamists and conservatives under its umbrella.
Very quickly, the identity debate became an electoral 
game.8 Nidaa Tounes, the party that former Prime Minis-
ter Beji Caid Essebsi created and that elevated him to the 
presidency of the republic in 2014, was launched in 2012 
“in order to save Tunisia’s modern way of life.” Ennahdha’s 
massive street demonstrations in 2013 were meant to pro-
tect not only its “legitimacy” but also  “Islamic Tunisia.”
The identity game played out on TV, in social media, in 
the streets, inside parliament, and in many other venues.9 
The 2014 voters’ majority did not go to the polls looking 
for detailed economic or political programs but rather to 
vote for a specific identity against the other. The tension 
that this has created was followed after elections by a 
feeling of betrayal among the voters, when the “Tuni-
sian” party Nidaa Tounes allied itself with the “Islamist” 
 monolith, Ennahdha.
The alliance, meant to reduce polarization and cement 
the identity schism, quickly became an empty shell when 
Nidaa Tounes fell apart shortly after. While the Islamist 
vs. secularist debate has decreased in intensity since the 
2014 elections, it did not disappear; the continuous dis-
solution of Nidaa Tounes as well as Ennahdha’s resilience 
make a return to this polarizing debate imminent.
An Open Debate
The clashes over identity that materialized in the public 
sphere, at home, and in school, have had consequences on 
how people relate to their state. Advocates of a return to 
authoritarianism, on one hand, are taking advantage of 
social divisions to support their claims: that of defending 
the nation, in the name of the Bourguibist state and iden-
tity, and preventing it from falling into civil strife. This 
has appealed to many youths. On the other hand, radical 
anti-authoritarian groups – largely youth led – advocate 
a total removal of those who worked for Bourguiba and 
Ben Ali (hundreds of thousands of people), positioning 
themselves in a semi-opposition to state institutions, and 
demanding that the country’s history be rewritten. Even 
criminal gangs and corruption rings are carving out a 
niche for themselves amid these polarizing sentiments, as 
the feeling of belonging to the state vanishes and as many 
young people are therefore engulfed in illicit trade and 
other illegal activities. 
In Tunisian hip-hop, particularly popular among youth 
who live in poor neighborhoods, slogans against the 
state are not rare. One song uses the national anthem’s 
first couplet and adds that, in Tunisia, “here your right 
is stolen” – a strong statement that rights are revoked in 
the name of the state.10 Football continues to attract large 
numbers of youngsters who shy away from politics and 
civic engagement, with matches often ending in violence 
between the football clubs’ supporters and the police and 
in hooligans’ attacks on public property in the vicinity 
of stadiums. Burning police stations, ransacking state 
buildings, and assaulting civil servants are other forms of 
anti-state actions that did not disappear after the revolu-
tion. For some Tunisians, there is no difference between 
the state and the ruling regime; the state is the political 
regime of the moment. They see it as a corrupt and brutal 
useless machine, and their frustration against specific 
political, social, or economic decisions is often directed 
toward the Tunisian state itself.
Radical Islamist groups such as ISIS or Al Qaeda are 
exploiting this malaise to spread their own vision for 
society, which many Tunisian youth have succumbed to. 
Unsurprisingly, thousands of Tunisians left the country to 
join ISIS’s self-proclaimed autonomous territory, burning 
their Tunisian passports in the process and exchanging 
their Tunisian names for “Khilafah” ones. In doing so, 
they have deliberately chosen to cancel their Tunisian 
identity, delegitimize the Tunisian state, and adopt ISIS 
“citizenship.”
This of course needs to be nuanced. The identity prob-
lem is not unique to Tunisia. It is a global phenomenon, 
and particularly keenly felt in the Arab world. Besides, it 
does not seem out of control, as recent polls have shown 
that a majority of Tunisians still hold their national 
sense of belonging in higher regard than any other.11 The 
number of Tunisians who joined ISIS, although very high, 
represents a tiny majority of Tunisia’s youth, and the num-
ber of victims of terrorist attacks in the country remains 
limited when compared to other countries such as Libya, 
Egypt, or even France.
Yet the problem is there, and it needs to be contained 
before it escalates. The total number of voters in 2014 was 
one million less than that of 2011, with the highest absten-
tion rate among young voters. Demonstrations and strikes 
organized by young people, often critical of state policies, 
are reported on on a daily basis, especially in  Tunisia’s 
inland regions. Tunisian fighters in the ranks of ISIS, es-
Tunisia’s Postcolonial Identity Crisis  4
DGAPkompakt  / Nr. 23 / December 2016
sentially youth in their 20s, are dispersed throughout Iraq, 
Syria, and Libya and number in the thousands. Clearly, 
Tunisia’s youth are angry.
Various measures should be taken to help Tunisia’s 
youth cope with this painful identity problem. First of 
all, a state-led reform of the program of education is 
needed. Reformers should come up with unifying themes 
and symbols that may be accepted unilaterally and avoid 
including divisive lines in history books, especially for 
younger generations. A possibility would be to postpone 
teaching post-1956 history to children and teenagers but 
to keep debating it and popularizing it through civil so-
ciety. Campaigns may be helpful here to raise awareness 
among youngsters and adults about important figures and 
dates from Tunisian history, stressing factors that united 
the Tunisian people rather than what divided them. Civil 
society activists involved in such activities must show 
neutrality and be on good terms with all sides.
As another step, representatives from the state and civ-
il society need to bring together all of Tunisia’s  political 
figures for a national dialogue on identity, emulating the 
2013 national dialogue that solved Tunisia’s political crisis. 
A defining set of historic figures, dates, and concepts 
should not be called into question or brought back in 
every electoral campaign or political battle. The politi-
cal debate should avoid the accusation of blasphemy (by 
Islamists) or treason (by nationalists), usually based on 
one side’s or the other’s claims to “historic truth.” 
A Tunisia reconciled with its past can contribute to 
the success of its democratic transition and provide an 
example to the rest of a region whose wars are largely 
legacies from the past.
Youssef Cherif is a Tunis-based political analyst 
 specializing on North African affairs. He holds a MA in 
international relations from King’s College London and a 
MA in classical studies from Columbia University.
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